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The United States was born from a struggle for independence and an act of union, and the 
nation’s identity has always centred on the foundational documents that expressed these acts: 
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Their importance is daily reflected in 
American civic religion, political rhetoric and court rulings. And they of course also feature 
prominently in the labours of the historical profession. Even more than the Declaration, the 
framing and ratification of the Constitution is a perennial topic of American historiography. 
But as a rule, professional historians have been quite critical of how politicians and the public 
celebrate the document and its origins, finding naked self-interest and fierce conflict where 
laymen see an exemplary story of patriotism and national unity. The best-known of these 
critical readings remains Charles Beard’s ‘economic interpretation’ of the Constitution, now 
more than a century old. Although a complex and nuanced work, Beard is best remembered 
for his attempt to establish the ‘property affiliations’ of delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, with the implication that more than anything else the Constitution was a giant 
speculative venture to raise the value of near-worthless government bonds. 
Beard was a prominent member of the first generation of ‘Progressive’ American 
historians, thus named after the historical period in U.S. history that span the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Progressive scholars saw material self-interest and above all class conflict 
as the driving forces of history and their approach had a profound impact on American 
historical inquiry in general and on the study of the origins of the Constitution in particular. In 
fact, up until around 1960, Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States completely dominated the field. However, in the decades that followed, most of 
the profession turned its back on the political history of the Constitution’s genesis and those 
who soldiered on followed their peers in a turn toward a cultural and intellectual history that 
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downplayed political and legal institutions in favour of mapping broad ideological 
transformations.1 
In the 1960s Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood uncovered a rich and largely unexplored 
intellectual world, which they presented in books that replaced Beard to become new 
intellectual milestones. Less iconoclastic than Beard and the Progressives, the so-called 
‘Ideological school’ nonetheless issued a profound challenge to America’s perception of 
itself. Together with John Pocock and his disciples, Bailyn and Wood questioned the long-
held view among both scholars and laymen that the American founding was fundamentally a 
Lockean, or liberal, moment. Their challenge shifted the terrain away from the Progressives, 
for whom the liberal nature of the founding had never been in doubt—if for the most part 
lamented. Instead, the ideological interpretation presented the founding as a classical 
republican rearguard action to contain the inevitable advance of liberalism in the struggle for 
the soul of America. But with their attention fastened on culture and ideas, historians no 
longer had time for institutions. The Constitution along with its clauses sanctifying contracts 
and banning paper money, which Beard and others had once presented as markers of 
economic liberalism, were deemed irrelevant when scholars concentrated on changes in a 
collective ‘mind’ or a nebulous political ‘culture.’ It is symptomatic that the most intense 
debates about the exact point in time when liberalism replaced republicanism revolved not 
around the framing and ratification of the Constitution, but around the formulation of a 
Jeffersonian ideology in the 1790s.2 
Historiographical milestones became millstones when the Ideological school failed to 
demonstrate that the political discourse of the founding was structured by sharply demarcated 
                                                      
1 James H. Hutson, ‘The Creation of the Constitution: Scholarship at a Standstill,’ Reviews in American History, 
xii (1984). 
2 The historiography is discussed in Robert E. Shalhope, ‘Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an 
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,’ William and Mary Quarterly, xxix (1972) and 
Robert E. Shalhope, ‘Republicanism and Early American Historiography,’ William and Mary Quarterly, xxxix, 
(1982). 
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republican and liberal worldviews that followed each other in succession. Instead, scholars 
found a polyglot ‘confusion of idioms’ and ‘clatter’ of tongues. Polyglotism indicates that to 
the framers of the Constitution, ideas and concepts were means to persuade and to make the 
world intelligible. But the estrangement of the Ideological historians from agency, 
institutions, and materiality prevented them from making the intellectual leap required to 
pursue this lead. By 1987, when the United States celebrated the bicentennial of the 
Constitution, the republican synthesis was dying from consumption.3 
Whereas the exploration of republicanism would continue to thrive in European 
intellectual history, its premature death in the United States appeared to take the steam out of 
the study of the Constitution altogether. When the Journal of American History published its 
bicentennial special issue on ‘The Constitution and American Life,’ David Thelen, the editor 
at the time, explained that the reason why there was no article on the founding was because 
‘experts on the drafting and ratification of the Constitution’ had told him ‘that there was little 
fresh thinking in their field.’ Only a few years earlier, James Hutson had published an 
exhaustive overview of the historiography of the Constitution’s origins which he chose to 
subtitle ‘scholarship at a standstill.’4 
Yet perhaps the intellectual desert of the bicentennial was not quite as barren as Hutson 
and Thelen believed. A lone dissenting voice argued that ‘prematurely pessimistic 
assessments’ had failed to notice ‘how the field itself is being redefined’ thanks to yet another 
historiographical turn, this time toward the study of federalism and international relations. To 
Peter Onuf, the founding was a period marked neither by class struggle between the people 
and the elite, as the Progressives said, or by the transition from republicanism to liberalism, as 
                                                      
3 Daniel T. Rodgers, ‘Republicanism: the Career of a Concept,’ Journal of American History, lxxix (1992); Isaac 
Kramnick, ‘The “Great National Discussion”: The Discourse of Politics in 1787,’ William and Mary Quarterly, 
3d. ser., xlv (1988), 4, 12 (quotations). 
4 David Thelen, introduction to ‘The Constitution and American Life: A Special Issue,’ Journal of American 
History, lxxiv (1987), 667; Hutson, “The Creation of the Constitution 
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suggested by the Ideological interpretation, but by the crisis of the American union in the 
wake of the War of Independence. More than anything else, the Constitution represented ‘the 
efforts of constitutional reformers to construct—and conceptualize—a workable federal 
system.’ A decade later, the redefinition of the field had matured into a complex but cohesive 
explanation of the form and function of the Constitution.5 
Sometimes called a ‘Unionist,’ sometimes an ‘International,’ interpretation of the 
founding, this perspective points to international and intra-union, rather than domestic, 
relations in the analysis of both the causes and the consequences of the Constitution. And 
rather than competition between classes, it points to competition between polities as the main 
driver of political development. The International interpretation therefore calls for a return to, 
and a reassessment of, the so-called ‘dual revolution’ thesis that has often been used to make 
sense of the American nation-building process. The term was coined by a Progressive 
historian contemporary with Beard, Carl Becker, to capture how the American founding was 
at the same time ‘a struggle for home rule,’ or independence, and ‘a struggle over who should 
rule at home,’ or, in Becker’s words, a struggle over ‘the democratization of American 
politics and society.’ Although the progressive tradition has never denied the significance of 
independence it has always emphasised the struggle over democratization as the more 
important development. The International interpretation reverses this priority by arguing that 
neither political independence nor the creation of a stable federal union were foregone 
conclusions of the American Revolution. 
The historiographical shift in focus from domestic politics to foreign affairs and 
federalism represented by the international interpretation of the origins of the Constitution has 
many sources. One is the trend toward an Atlantic perspective on early American history. As 
scholars have turned their sights from the nation-state and its genesis to the larger multiethnic, 
                                                      
5 Peter S. Onuf, ‘Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective,’ 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d. ser., xlvi (1989), 342 and 344. 
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multilinguistic, multinational, multicentred cluster of entities that constituted a larger Atlantic 
world, it has become ever more difficult to ignore the larger, often quite menacing 
geopolitical context in which the United States was created. Another source is the revitalized 
field of British imperial history. Historians have come to see the United States as a successor 
regime to the British Empire in North America and the federal government as the successor to 
an imperial government whose concerns were predominantly relations within the empire and 
with other powers. These historiographical impulses have generated a renewed appreciation 
for the role and function of the American federal union—that is, the terms by which a 
collection of former colonies joined together to form a single polity. 
The International interpretation has important implications for our understanding of the 
American founding and early United States history and therefore deserves to be more widely 
known. Its perspective shift raises the question if scholars have mischaracterized both the 
Constitution and the American union and thereby exaggerated the degree to which the 
founders sought to radically recast early American social and political life. Consequently, if 
perhaps counterintuitively, the reinterpretation of the Constitution’s origins put forward by the 
International perspective therefore also allows for a fresh look at the old question at the heart 
of the Progressive interpretation, about who should rule at home once American independence 
was secured, and thus for a reinvigoration of the tradition of constitutional analysis initiated 
by Beard well over a hundred years ago.6 
 
I 
                                                      
6 Other attempts to present this argument in systematic form are David C. Hendrickson, ‘The Constitution in 
History: A Bibliographical Essay,’ in Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding 
(Lawrence, Kan., 2003), 281-97; Alan Gibson, Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over 
the Origins and Foundations of the American Republic (Lawrence, Kan., 2010, 2nd ed.), ch. 8; Robbie J. Totten, 
‘Security, Two Diplomacies, and the Formation of the U.S. Constitution: Review, Interpretation, and New 
Directions for the Study of the Early American Period,’ Diplomatic History, xxxvi (2012); Tom Cutterham, ‘The 
International Dimension of the Federal Constitution,’ Journal of American Studies, xlviii (2014). 
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Historiographical breakthroughs can best be discerned against the backdrop of what went on 
before. The Progressive approach provides the most pertinent point of comparison for like the 
Internationalist perspective it privileges actions and institutions over ideas. It is both a 
venerable and diverse tradition. In the ascendancy before the Second World War, it fell into 
disrepute when the United States mobilized against communism at the outbreak of the Cold 
War, only to stage a comeback in a different guise in the altered social climate of the 1960s. 
Lumping together the methodologically more advanced and politically more radical analyses 
of neo-Progressive and New Left historians with the relatively coarser handiwork of 
Progressive progenitors is of course intellectually questionable. What follows is a limited 
survey of four historians, whose books span a century of scholarship. In the study of the 
Constitution’s origins, Charles Beard is the founding father of the Progressive interpretation. 
Merrill Jensen was a second-generation Progressive whose most important works appeared in 
the middle decades of the previous century. Terry Bouton and Woody Holton are the most 
sophisticated present-day exponents of an updated Beardian approach. The aim is not an 
exhaustive account of the Progressive perspective, for that the reader will have to look 
elsewhere, but the construction of a reference point that will make the central elements of the 
Internationalist edifice appear in sharper relief.7 
                                                      
7 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York, 1935 
[1913]); Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States during the Confederation, 1781-1789 
(New York, 1950); Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: ‘The People,’ the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of 
the American Revolution (New York, 2007); Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the 
Constitution (New York, 2007). In addition to Beard, leading Progressive historians in the early twentieth 
century include Carl L. Becker, J. Franklin Jameson, Vernon Louis Parrington, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., and 
Jackson Turner. In the neo-Progressive generation, the leading scholar is Merrill Jensen, who trained around fifty 
graduate students at the University of Wisconsin, many of whom would become influential historians in their 
own right. The first generation of Progressive historians is discussed in Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive 
Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (New York, 1968). The subsequent development of their perspective is 
traced in Alfred F. Young, ‘American Historians Confront ‘The Transforming Hand of Revolution’,’ in Young 
and Gregory H. Nobles, Whose American Revolution Was It? Historians Interpret the Founding (New York, 
2011). A recent example of the staying power of the Progressive interpretation is Michael J. Klarman, The 
Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution (New York, 2016), which, however, adds little 
that is new to the Progressive analysis. 
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Progressives do not deny the inherent duality of the American Revolution, but they 
emphasize the importance of internal transformations over national independence. Conflict 
between distinctive social groups within America is the core of the Progressive interpretation. 
Progressives apply general assumptions about the nature of social and political relations to the 
specific social and political dynamic set in motion by the American Revolution. Their social 
theory understands society to be divided into discrete and relatively stable classes, whose 
identity is determined by the unequal distribution of property. In principle, the existence of 
class does not necessarily lead to class conflict. Historians studying the struggle for home 
rule, or the nation’s pristine identity, habitually homogenize America and stress consensus 
between social groups. But Progressives see class interests as not only different but inherently 
antagonistic.8 
The dynamic set in motion by the American Revolution has both an economic and a 
political dimension. The War of Independence and its outcome resulted in economic 
challenges and opportunities. Attempts to pay interest on the large public debt by means of 
increased taxation created widespread hardship. But freedom from British restraints created 
opportunities to trade in new international markets and to expand European American 
settlement into the continental interior. The political consequences of the Revolution, 
meanwhile, were threefold. First, the supervisory role of the British government was 
removed, leaving the new American states free to determine their own political course. 
Second, the constitutional reforms that took place during the Revolution made the state 
assemblies the principal locus of power in the state governments, at the expense of the 
executive and judicial branches. Third, lower property restrictions for voting broadened the 
                                                      
8 Beard, Economic Interpretation, 19. In an ironic twist of fate, Beard’s opposition to U.S. interventionism and 
entry into the Second World War made him devote the final period of his life to international relations. As much 
as the perceived Marxism of his economic interpretation, it was Beard’s opposition to an interventionist United 
States that discredited him in the eyes of a postwar history profession that had turned intensely patriotic. 
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franchise and brought new classes of men into the state assemblies. To the Progressives, these 
three changes amount to a democratization of American politics.9 
Economic opportunities and difficulties, combined with the democratization of politics, 
produced a new political agenda in the independent American states. For the first time, a 
majority of the people was now represented in all-powerful state assemblies. They used their 
power to enact legislation that protected their property interests, such as paper money 
emissions, tax reductions, and stay laws to suspend the collection of private debts. While 
protecting the people, this legislation had a negative impact on the social and economic elite 
by diminishing the value of their public securities and salaries. Once independence was 
secured, the elite mobilized in defense of their property interests, and by extension their social 
standing, in an attempt to reign in the people. The outcome was the adoption of the 
Constitution, which reintroduced an unrepresentative central government with the power to 
overrule legislation enacted by popular majorities in state assemblies. In the Progressive 
reading, the framing and ratification of the Constitution represents ‘the culmination of an anti-
democratic crusade.’10 
Newer Progressive interpretations have lost some of the analytical nuances of the 
pathbreakers. Historians have turned away from social science methodology and ‘class’ is 
now approached as a subjective identity rather than an objective reality. Thus, while class 
remains central to Holton and Bouton their terminology is vague and shifting and their socio-
economic groups undefined. Bouton finds ‘ordinary’ or ‘common folk,’ sometimes ‘ordinary 
white men,’ opposing the Constitution and ‘the elite,’ ‘the gentry,’ or ‘gentlemen’ supporting 
it. As with Holton, it is nevertheless clear that the core opposition is made up of self-owning 
                                                      
9 J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Boston 1956 [1926], 18-19; 
Jensen, New Nation, 259-60, 424-27; Jackson Turner Main, ‘The American Revolution and the Democratization 
of the Legislatures,’ William and Mary Quarterly, 3d. ser., xxiii (1966); Holton, Unruly Americans, 4-5. 
10 Beard, Economic Interpretation, 19-51; Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the 
Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution 1774-1781 (Madison, Wis., 1970 [1940], xv 
(quotation); Jensen, New Nation, 234-57, 302-26, 375-98, 424-27. 
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farmers—’small farmers,’ ‘smallholders,’ and the ‘agrarian majority’—a group that Allan 
Kulikoff and others have called the ‘yeoman class.’ Among the Constitution’s supporters, the 
creditor interest, primarily public creditors, is an important group.11 
Beard’s and Jensen’s social taxonomy is more specific. To Beard, the Constitution 
received support from owners of four kinds of personal property: ‘money, public securities, 
manufactures, and trade and shipping.’ Its opponents were ‘the small farming and debtor 
interests.’ Even more commonly, he postulated a long-running conflict between capitalists 
and agrarians, in which slaveholding planters joined the ranks of the small farmers.12 In a 
similar vein, Jensen sees merchants, ship owners, capitalists, professionals, and public 
creditors facing farmers, including some rich planters in the South, artisans, manufacturers, 
and debtors.13 But regardless of the level of specificity, Progressives tend to work with a 
binary division of society according to property interests, which is reproduced in most states, 
north and south, east and west. Progressives are of course aware of sectional differences such 
as slavery, but in their analysis this binary class division overrides them and largely clears the 
political playing field from state and sectional interests. 
In the 1960s, the New Left historians extended historical inquiry beyond white 
propertied males to incorporate the experiences, including political ideas and actions, of so-
called marginal groups. That such groups are absent from the works of Beard and Jensen is 
hardly surprising. That they play such a limited role in the interpretations of Bouton and 
Holton is more so, for theirs are intended as radical interventions. Elsewhere, Holton has 
convincingly argued that indirectly American Indians, African American slaves, and 
propertyless whites were instrumental in pushing the Virginia gentry into opposition against 
                                                      
11 ‘Yeoman is a class term relating to famers who owned the means of production and participated in commodity 
markets in order to sustain familial autonomy,’ Allan Kulikoff, ‘The Rise and Demise of the American Yeoman 
Class,’ in Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism (Charlottesville, Va., 1992), 34. 
12 Beard, Economic Interpretation, 324-25. 
13 Jensen, Articles of Confederation, xiii-xiv, 7-15, 109-10, 239-45; Jensen, New Nation, 3-5, 21-23, 42-53, 125-
28, 399-400, 422-28. 
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Britain in the 1770s. But writing on the Constitution, Holton, like Bouton, merely says that to 
secure social peace, the elite delegates of the Constitutional convention had to take into 
account the needs and concerns of the nation’s small farmers.14 
Two things likely operate to constrict the analysis, demonstrating the difficulty of 
breaking free from Beard’s powerful analysis of the Constitution’s origins. One is the focus 
on the founders’ motives that can be traced back to Beard’s wish to unmask the framers to 
show how sordid self-interest hid beneath lofty ideals of liberty and equality for all.15 But this 
focus on the motives of the founders, and of their vocal critics, risks underestimating the role 
played by the silenced majority of women, propertyless males, and slaves in bringing about, 
and in indirectly shaping, the Constitution, not as direct agents but by being prominently on 
the framers’ minds. A similar argument can be made about European powers and their 
citizens, and about American Indian nations, who were not part of the American polity but 
very much part of American politics. For regardless of who wrote, supported, and opposed the 
Constitution, it was intended to touch the lives of people far beyond the social groups that had 
taken active part in the Constitutional convention and in the struggle for ratification.16 
The second influence from Beard is the notion that politics can be reduced to the 
protection of property interests, where property is defined rather narrowly as real estate and 
money. With such an understanding of politics, the searchlight of the historian will inevitably 
                                                      
14 Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in 
Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999); Holton, Unruly Americans,157-58. The idea that the non-elite impacted the 
Constitution by being on the minds of the framers was presented by Alfred F. Young in ‘The Framers of the 
Constitution and the “Genius of the People”,’ Radical History Review, xlii (1988), 7-47. Staughton Lynd made 
this point about slaves already in the 1960s in ‘Introduction: Beyond Beard,’ in Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, 
and the United States Constitution (Indianapolis, Ind., 1967), 18: ‘The slave, though he spoke few words, should 
be moved front and center. If, as Beard said, there was a ‘large propertyless mass’ which the Constitution 
‘excluded at the outset,’ the one-fifth of the population in hereditary bondage better deserves that description 
than any group of whites; for few whites who began life without property failed to acquire it.’ Lynd then went on 
to argue that the compromise over slavery was the crucial event of the Constitutional convention necessary to 
bring together northern and southern elites in the reform of the Union. See further below n38. Beard dismissed 
the impact of the non-voting working class in Economic Interpretation, 25. 
15 Beard, Economic Interpretation, 73-151; Holton, Unruly Americans, 3-16. 
16 A cultural history of the white male founding generation’s concern with ethnic and gendered ‘others’ is Carroll 
Smith-Rosenberg, This Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010). 
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be trained on the social groups that owned property, or stood a chance to acquire it. As a 
result, the actions and beliefs of white propertied males become central, to the exclusion of 
everyone else. This narrow conception of property of course blunts the radicalism of the 
Progressive interpretation in an age concerned with equal rights and identity politics. Be that 
as it may, property in real estate—land and slaves—and ‘personalty’—money and public 
securities—define the classes that are the principal agents in the mainstream Progressive 
history of the Constitution. Beard is famous for suggesting that ‘above all’ the Constitution 
appealed ‘to the owners of personalty anxious to find a foil against the attacks of levelling 
democracy.’ To Bouton the Constitution was quite simply the elite’s attempt ‘to redirect 
wealth and power to moneyed men.’ True to character, Jensen presents a longer and more 
diverse agenda. Merchants demanded navigation acts, artisans and manufacturers protective 
tariffs, farmers tax relief, creditors tax hikes, frontiersmen protection from Native American 
attacks, etc. But more than anything else, Progressives hold that the interlinked issues of paper 
money and impairments of contracts, which followed from the pressure to deal with the 
wartime debt, divided the American political nation. Public creditors demanded heavy 
taxation in gold and silver to make possible interest payments in specie. The taxpaying 
majority favored lower taxation and interest payments in paper.17 
Economic policy was forged in the state assemblies. Jensen points out that demands for 
government support for the pursuit of private material interest was nothing new in America. 
‘Ever since the founding of the colonies, Americans had been accustomed to government 
intervention in economic matters’ in the form of land grants, tax exemptions, monopolies, and 
bounties. Faced with both economic opportunities and economic difficulties after 
independence, ‘it was natural for Americans to demand government aid.’ But the political 
changes brought about by the Revolution meant that the balance of power between social 
                                                      
17 Beard, Economic Interpretation, 154; Bouton, Taming Democracy; Jensen, New Nation, 245, 259-60. 
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classes had shifted dramatically. After independence, ‘the states alone had the power to 
legislate on economic matters’ and the state assemblies had come under the control of new 
men.18 
As ‘state after state in 1785 and 1786 adopted some form of paper money that could be 
loaned on farm mortgages and used to pay taxes, and in some cases private debts as well,’ the 
elite ‘became desperate.’ Their response was a plan to restrain the power of the state 
assemblies over economic policy by transferring political authority from the states to a new 
national government deliberately insulated from popular influence. In Holton’s words, the 
elite wanted a political order that, whenever necessary, allowed them to appeal ‘an 
unfavorable jury verdict to a higher court.’ In the Constitution, states were proscribed from 
certain actions deemed threatening to the elite, such as issuing paper money or impairing the 
obligations of contracts. The national government was shielded from popular influence by the 
extension of electoral districts that ‘would enhance the likelihood that representatives would 
be wealthy men’ removed ‘from grassroots pressure.’ The enlarged electoral district, says 
Bouton, was ‘the most powerful barrier’ against popular politics, which ‘placed a tremendous 
organizing burden on anyone pushing reforms opposed to the ruling elite.’19 
The ultimate aim of the elite was the creation of ‘a central government with power to 
coerce the state governments and their citizens’ in order to protect their own property 
interests. The historians discussed here have been reluctant to systematically investigate the 
degree to which the elite was successful. Bouton is alone in devoting a substantial part of his 
book to the decade after ratification. He concludes that adoption of the Constitution was ‘an 
enduring victory for the elite’ that permanently ‘constricted the meaning and practice of 
democracy,’ on the one hand, and replaced ideals of economic equality with acceptance of an 
                                                      
18 Jensen, New Nation, 245 (‘states alone’), 248, 283 (‘ever since’; ‘natural’), 285-87. 
19 Jensen, New Nation, 426 (‘state after state’); Holton, Unruly Americans, 9-10; Bouton, Taming Democracy, 
260-61. 
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‘uninhibited wealth accumulation’ that made possible ‘a largely unimpeded concentration of 
wealth across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,’ on the other hand. In his survey of 
U.S. history, Beard argued that the social classes who had clashed over the Constitution 
continued their struggle as Federalists and Jeffersonians, thereby allowing for another round 
of fighting between capitalists and agrarians over the control of the national government. 
Jensen and Holton leave the question suspended.20 
Although this brief survey hardly does justice to the rich Progressive tradition, it serves 
to highlight how the International interpretation offers a different reading of events. Where 
the Progressives believe the principal political agents to be classes, the Internationalists 
concentrate on polities: European monarchies, American states, the federal union, and 
American Indian nations. Where the Progressives see the principal historical dynamic 
springing from class struggle, the Internationalists find it in geopolitical competition and 
sectional tension. Where the Progressives find the principal political agenda of the 
constitutional reform movement to be the redistribution of property and status from ‘ordinary 
people’ to the elite, the Internationalists describe it as an attempt to defend US territorial 
integrity and the national interest from competitors in the western borderlands and on the 
Atlantic Ocean. Where the Progressives identify the principal outcome of the founding to be 
the creation of a bourgeois state that faced inwards to make North America safe for 
capitalism, the Internationalists identify it as the creation of a stronger federal union that faced 
outward to stand up to European powers and to conquer the North American continent. 
 
II 
Onuf’s prescience at the bicentennial of the founding came from his own role in forcing 
historiographical change. His scholarly trajectory began in 1983 with a study of how 
                                                      
20 Jensen, New Nation, 4 (‘central government’); Bouton, Taming Democracy, 260, 261, 263; Charles A. Beard 
and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization. Vol. I: The Agricultural Era (London, 1927), 350-58. 
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‘jurisdictional controversies’ over state land claims and secessionist movements in the trans-
Appalachian west during the American Revolution fed into the creation of the Constitution. It 
was soon followed by a book on the Northwest Ordinance. At the time, the West was a highly 
unusual vantage point from which to write the history of the founding, but it meant that 
Onuf’s analysis came to foreground inter-state conflict and federalism and to identify the 
creation of a viable union as the single most important political problem of the founding era. 
He next brought this outlook to bear on the making of the Constitution in a series of essays 
written for publications marking the bicentennial, which were then reworked into a book co-
authored with Cathy Matson. A Union of Interest: Political and Economic Thought in 
Revolutionary America that appeared in 1990. It added to the analysis of western expansion 
and state conflict an account of how the immersion of the American states in the Atlantic 
marketplace also gave rise to intra-union tensions. It was the first fully-fledged international 
interpretation of the origins of the Constitution.21 
Onuf owed an intellectual debt to his advisor Jack P. Greene, who in 1986 published 
Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British 
Empire and the United States, 1607-1788, a book based on decades of research into the 
British Empire and colonial America, which drew extensively on Onuf for the post-
independence period. In Peripheries and Center, Greene acknowledged his own debt to 
Andrew McLaughlin and Charles McIlwain, constitutional scholars of the British Empire and 
the United States active in the 1920s, and thus sank historiographical roots for  an 
International interpretation. Greene made the case for the persistence of a fundamental 
political problem in the English and British imperial project: how to govern a geographically 
‘extended polity.’ From the establishment of the first colonies in North America to the 
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outbreak of the American Revolution, Britons on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to 
maintain a central power strong enough to keep the far-flung Empire together without 
endangering the liberty and safety of its constituent parts. The American Revolution removed 
Britain from the equation but otherwise left organizational issues unaddressed when the 
problem of empire turned into the problem of union. Attempts to resolve the tension between 
the whole and the constituent parts ‘provide the underlying unity to early American 
constitutional history from colonial through the early national periods,’ Greene says. To Onuf, 
‘the definition of the federal union’ remained ‘the central problem in American political 
discourse’ to the Civil War.22 
Economic and administrative limits meant that the English Crown colonized North 
America by proxy using charter companies and proprietary lords. Two important 
consequences followed from this mode of colonization. First, there was not one but many 
colonization ventures, which resulted in a number of distinctive colonies largely autonomous 
from the imperial center. Second, because the sponsors, too, had limited economic and 
administrative resources at their command they could only attract settlers by extending the 
rights and privileges of native born Englishmen to the American colonies. Chief among these 
was the right to extensive self-rule in legislative assemblies representing local landowners. 
These ‘contracts’ between sponsors and settlers formed the basis for every colony’s 
‘particular constitution.’ In the century and a half that followed on the establishment of 
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Jamestown and Plymouth Plantation, the understanding that the colonies had a separate 
corporate identity and distinctive corporate privileges became entrenched in North America. 
‘Consisting of a well-defined body of territory, each of the colonies had its own particular 
constitution, institutions, laws, history, and identity, to which its inhabitants were, for the 
most part, both well socialized and strongly attached.’23 
The colonists’ belief in the corporate identity of their satellite states raises the question 
why the struggle against England produced not thirteen independent nations but one. This 
mystery dissolves when the act of declaring independence is scrutinized more closely. In an 
insightful essay, John Pocock asked what it meant that the rebelling colonies chose to call 
themselves ‘united states.’ ‘State’ was not the default term for a political organization at the 
time, at least not in the Anglophone world, but was derived from the law of nations to signal 
that the colonies assumed for themselves the status of sovereign polities vis-à-vis other 
sovereign polities. Their declaration announced that they were ‘Free and Independent States’ 
possessing ‘full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce,’ 
and the right ‘to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.’ As 
Pocock points out, this presents us with ‘the problem of what happens when thirteen “states” 
are made to claim that they are “free and independent” and that they are ‘united’.’24 
The answer is that the colonies used the federative powers they had assumed as 
independent states to enter into union. In Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu had explained how 
federations were the fruit of ‘an agreement by which several small states agree to become 
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members of a larger one … It is a kind of society of societies.’ These societies were formed, 
Pocock writes, when states exercised their ‘power to conclude peace and war by means of 
treaties or foedera.’ The American union, announced to the world in the Declaration of 
Independence, should therefore be seen as a treaty organization. In July 1776, the American 
foedus was implied rather than explicit, the result of a decade of consultation between, and 
concerted action by, the colonies, but it would soon be spelled out in the Articles of 
Confederation. The ‘firm league of friendship’ established by the ratification of the Articles 
constituted the United States not as ‘a body politic but an association of bodies politic.’ The 
Novus Ordo Seclorum motto to the contrary, such a political organization was nothing new 
but was well-established in the law of nations and ‘readily recognizable’ to European 
‘eighteenth-century taxonomists of political forms as a “league of firm friendship,” a 
“république federative,” or a “system of states”.’ That a treaty could create a union making it 
possible for several states to act as one nation explains why a portfolio of American organic 
laws, aimed at impressing European courts, described the Articles of Confederation as a 
‘Treaty,’ that formed a ‘Constitution, or mode of Government, for the collective North-
American Commonwealth.’25 
The goal of the American union created by the Declaration and formalized by the 
Articles was, in Onuf’s analysis, twofold: to ‘constitute a more perfect world order for the 
colony-states,’ on the one hand, and to serve as ‘a legitimate (recognizable) government’ of 
the union ‘in the larger world,’ on the other hand.26 But the first union failed miserably on 
both counts. After independence, critical issues confronted the United States in the western 
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marchlands of the continental interior as well as in the Atlantic marketplace. In the West, the 
Continental Congress had only nominal control over the American Indians and European 
American settler colonists who resided there. Britain violated the new nation’s territorial 
integrity by maintaining military posts on American soil and diplomatic relations with Indian 
nations living within the borders of the United States. On the Atlantic Ocean and beyond, the 
expulsion of the American colonies from the common market of the British Empire had led to 
a sharp downturn in exports and shipping, which in turn had caused an economic depression. 
A third challenge lay in the cracks that had begun to appear in the federal union, where 
conflicts of interest between the member states over the Revolutionary debt, commercial 
regulations, and territorial claims were producing tension. Times were bad, the future of the 
Union in doubt. In this climate the Constitutional convention met in May 1787 to ‘render the 
federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 
Union.’27 
The principal purpose of the Constitutional convention was therefore not to restrict 
democracy, promote property interests, or turn America into a liberal society—although such 
outcomes may well have been unintended, if not necessarily unwelcome, consequences—but 
to repair the Union. In political scientist Michael Zuckert’s words, the leading reformers were 
critical of the Confederation for ‘its failures to achieve the ends for which it was instituted, 
not its failure to reach ends beyond these.’ Looking back at the Convention from a distance of 
five decades, James Madison, the putative ‘father of the Constitution,’ presented the 
Constitution as a plan of union between sovereign republics. Throughout ancient and modern 
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history, he wrote echoing Montesquieu, ‘feeble communities, independent of each other, have 
resorted to Union … for the common safety ag[ain]st powerful neighbors, and for the 
preservation of peace and justice among themselves.’ The American Constitution was but 
another addition ‘to those examples.’28 
The idea that a union could preserve peace and justice among member-states harked 
back to a long tradition of peace plans. When the Americans formed their union 
‘Montesquieu, Vattel, and before them, a whole series of early world federalists had imagined 
a world of confederated states, freed from war,’ Onuf points out.29 Although Onuf was the 
first to analyze this aspect of the Union, the most elaborate discussion is found in the works of 
two political scientists: David Hendrickson’s Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American 
Founding from 2003, preceded by an influential article on the ‘Philadelphia System’ by 
Daniel Deudney. Union as a means of nation-building, another central part of Onuf’s analysis, 
has recently been the subject of detailed inquiries by Eliga Gould and Daniel Hulsebosch 
focusing on the problem of international recognition, and by Leonard Sadosky and others 
focusing on the organization of the national domain in the trans-Appalachian West. The 
following two sections will look closer at the Constitution as a peace pact and as an 
instrument of nation-building.30 
 
III 
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Today the word ‘constitution’ typically signifies a state’s basic legal order, with a special 
authority and superiority over lesser law. But its historical meaning has varied. Now largely 
lost is the notion of a constitution as a federal treaty, the means by which ‘several states join 
into a lasting political entity without giving up their own political independence in the 
process.’31 A federal treaty creates supra-state institutions of authority and transfers powers 
from the states to these institutions, but its ultimate aim is the preservation and protection of 
the corporate identity and corporate interests of the treaty parties.32 A central way to do this is 
by offering states entering into union a means to escape war, the default means of conflict 
resolution in the anarchic international state system and a principal existential threat to states. 
By replacing anarchy with union, Hendrickson argues that the Constitution of 1787 fulfilled a 
role comparable to the great peace settlements of early modern European history: Westphalia 
in 1648, Utrecht in 1713, and Vienna in 1815.33 
This understanding of the founding implies that the bonds of affection that held the 
American states together after independence were not strong enough to prevent them from 
acting out their self-interest to the detriment of other member states. Absent union, anarchy 
and inter-state competition would characterize their relationship and thereby extend to North 
America the European balance of power system with its arms races, bloated governments, and 
frequent wars.34 This prospect posed an existential threat to the newly independent American 
republics in two ways. Most obviously, a single state or group of states, with or without a 
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European ally, could achieve hegemony and subject the other states to its will. Less 
obviously, the republican system of government could be expected to corrode if external 
pressure became too pronounced. War always centralizes power and if wars were frequent, or 
the danger of war constant, there was a significant danger that centralized power would 
develop into despotic rule and the circumscription of civic rights. ‘America was without kings 
or military establishments; it would acquire both in circumstances of disunion,’ Hendrickson 
remarks. ‘It had no class of white men who, profiting from the “military system” so deeply 
entrenched in Europe, made the European laborer “go supperless to bed, and to moisten his 
bed with the sweat of his brows.” Disunion would bring that as well.’ Because the ‘internal 
character of states’ was perceived to be ‘a function of powerful systemic pressures generated 
by the structure of the “international system”,’ the preservation of republican rule in the 
American states depended on the creation and maintenance of a benevolent international 
environment in North America.35 Union was the means to do so. By defusing the danger of 
inter-state war, the federal treaty protected both the independence of the American states and 
their republican system of government. 
To maintain union the centripetal force of state interests had to be somehow neutralized 
without watering down state self-determination too much. A federal treaty entailed a 
voluntary circumscription of the treaty parties’ sovereignty. In Vattel’s words, the states ‘put 
some restraint on the exercise of [their sovereignty], in virtue of voluntary agreements.’36 But 
in the American case this did not mean that the thirteen states were consolidated into one 
nation-state. The framers of the Constitution steered a careful course between the twin 
dangers of national consolidation and civil war. They wrote into the Constitution protection 
both for the states’ corporate identity and for their essential interests, while at the same time 
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they attempted to remove sources of inter-state conflict and the power of the states to make 
war. 
The Constitution protected the corporate identity, or sovereignty, of the states by 
guaranteeing their territorial integrity and self-determination. Large states could not be 
subdivided and small states could not be merged with other states without their consent (Art. 
IV, sect. 3). States were protected from invasion and rebellion and guaranteed a ‘Republican 
Form of Government’ (Art. IV, sect. 4). The states were made essential elements of the 
federal government structure by the provision for equal state representation in the Senate (Art. 
I, sect. 3 and further protected by Art. V), but also by creating a House of Representatives 
elected by ‘the People of the several States’ (Art. I, sect. 2) and an executive chosen by state 
electors appointed ‘in such Manner as the Legislature [of each state] may direct’ (Art. II, sect. 
1). But the most important protection of state corporate identity was the framers’ design of a 
national government of limited and enumerated powers, which was geared toward the 
management of diplomacy, international trade, and war, but left domestic matters mostly 
alone.37 Federal government powers were explicitly listed in Art. I, sect. 8. Powers that were 
not enumerated there belonged to the states, a principle that was most clearly expressed in the 
constitutional postscript of the tenth amendment, which stated that ‘[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.’ 
All American states were concerned with their territorial integrity and self-
determination. Onuf and others have stressed how they also were keen to protect their 
particular economic interests. Social and economic diversity meant that states had potentially 
antagonistic material interests. Preserving the peace pact therefore required that the treaty 
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parties accepted both that other states had legitimate interests and that such interested states 
could nevertheless co-exist in a ‘union of interests.’ Matson and Onuf argue that this 
understanding of the American union was absent when the Constitutional convention 
assembled in Philadelphia and was worked out only in the course of its proceedings.38 
The two interests most clearly articulated in the convention were the slave interest of the 
southern states and the shipping interest of the northern and middle states. An inter-sectional 
agricultural interest was also voiced, with demands for action by a stronger national 
government to open foreign markets for American exports and western lands for European 
American settlers, and to keep open sea lanes and transportation routes and maintain peace in 
the trans-Appalachian West. These demands worked at cross purposes. If settlements were 
stepped up, a backlash from the American Indian nations controlling the region, and from 
Britain and Spain that still had ambitions there, could be expected. 
The Constitution provided both explicit and implicit protection for state economic 
interests. The slave states were strikingly successful in getting explicit protections written into 
the document, guaranteeing numerical advantage in the House of Representatives (Art. I, sect. 
2) and presidential elections (Art. II, sect. 1) as a result of the ‘three-fifths clause,’ which 
counted sixty percent of the slave population for purposes of representation; return of escapee 
slaves in the fugitive clause (Art. IV, sect. 2); and a continuation of the slave trade to at least 
1808 (Art. I, sect. 9; Art V). The Constitution also banned export duties (Art. I, sect. 9), which 
would have affected southern staples like rice and tobacco, and introduced a comity clause 
(Art. IV, sect. 1) that forced non-slave states to recognize the legality of slavery. So 
pronounced was the southern victory that recent works by George Van Cleve and David 
Waldstreicher have placed protection of slavery at the center of the American federal treaty, 
                                                      
38 Matson and Onuf, Union of Interests, 101-23. 
24 
 
vindicating an understanding once embraced by radical abolitionists and slave owners alike 
that the Constitution was a pro-slavery document.39 
The gains of the shipping interest were much more limited. Northern delegates defeated 
the slave states’ insistence on a qualified majority for Congress to pass navigation acts, but a 
two-thirds majority in the Senate was required to ratify commercial treaties (Art. II, sect. 2). 
The Northwest Ordinance was adopted by Congress in July 1787 thanks to delegates from the 
Constitutional convention, who were also members of Congress, taking time out of the 
convention to attend Congress. It was very likely part of sectional bargain over slavery. The 
Ordinance held out the promise to the northern agricultural interest that the West would be 
opened up for white settlement and that in time the region north of the Ohio River would be 
turned into three to five self-governing republics. The exclusion of slavery ensured the future 
of the Northwest Territory as a free soil region, but also implied slavery’s legality in future 
territories to be created south of the Ohio River.40 North and South, the argument was also 
made that economic interests would be promoted by the creation of a stronger national 
government with power to conclude beneficial trade agreements in the Atlantic marketplace 
and to pacify American Indian nations in the western borderlands.41 
Explicit guarantees for state economic interests were of course important. But just as 
important was the development in the convention of a general understanding of how to 
balance state interests with the need to preserve the union. This involved accepting that the 
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interests of other states were real and that the pursuit of self-interest was legitimate. Up to a 
point, the framers argued that claims about sectional antagonism—based on slave, shipping, 
and agricultural interests centered in the South, North, and West—were exaggerated and that 
the sections could co-exist in a harmonious ‘union of interests.’ But whenever state interests 
clashed, compromise alone, achieved by bargaining, could prevent disunion. ‘Union’ and 
‘independence’ became inseparable concepts in American political culture, the ‘Staatsräson’ 
of the American union in Hendrickson’s words, due to the conviction that only the peace pact 
could guarantee a republican system of government in the states and protection of vital state 
interests. This acceptance laid the foundation for a distinctive American style of politics, as 
the statesmen of the antebellum era became adept at developing the art of the sectional 
compromise.42 
If constitutional guarantees for the corporate identity and interests of the treaty parties 
was one way of maintaining the peace pact, another was the removal of sources of inter-state 
conflict. There were limits to such endeavors. Southern planters would not abolish slavery, 
northern merchants would not abandon the shipping industry. But beyond these confines, 
something could still be achieved. The landed states ceded their western territory to the nation 
in the mid and late 1780s. The right of Congress to make ‘Rules and Regulations’ to govern 
this common national domain was established by the Constitution (Art IV, sect. 3) and the 
rules themselves were spelled out in the Northwest Ordinance. As Onuf’s analysis of the 
Ordinance shows, in a single stroke, the discontent of the landless states for not having a stake 
in western expansion, and the repeated conflicts between states with overlapping western land 
claims, disappeared.43 
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Other sources of conflict were removed by the monopolization of commercial policy by 
the federal government, which prevented the enactment of competing tariffs by the states and 
competition in the Indian trade. The Constitution also prohibited the states from issuing paper 
money and interfering with contracts. In the postwar period such policies had defrauded out-
of-state creditors and caused inter-state friction. After the Constitution’s adoption, the fiscal 
resources of the new federal government made possible both payments on the national debt 
and the nationalization of large parts of the state debts, another source of conflict between the 
states.44 Should inter-state conflict still arise, the Constitution reduced the chance of 
escalation by depriving the states from the right to enter into alliances, to maintain troops, or 
to wage war without the consent of Congress (Art. I, sect. 8 and 10).45 Conflict resolution 
instead took the form of adjudication by the Supreme Court, which had judicial power over 
‘controversies between two or more States’ (Art. III, sect. 2). Boundary disputes had 
dominated inter-state conflicts before the adoption of the Constitution but rarely came before 
the federal court in the decades that followed. Rather than the Supreme Court, Congress 
provided a forum for inter-state conflict resolution through bargaining and compromise. 
 
IV 
If the peace pact was one purpose of the federal treaty, the other was to allow thirteen 
sovereign republics to act in unison as one nation against external powers. In the words of a 
contemporary jurist, the federal government became ‘the organ through which the states 
communicate with foreign nations.’ The law of nations established that all nations were equal. 
‘A dwarf is as much a man as a giant,’ Emer de Vattel wrote, ‘a small republic is no less a 
sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.’ But the equality of states extended beyond 
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their size to also apply to their form. Whether they were democratic or monarchical, unitary 
states or federal republics, they were all nations in relation to each other.46 
The ability to act as one nation provided protection against foreign aggression, which, 
just like the peace pact, guaranteed the continued independence of the American republics. 
Typically militarily weaker than monarchies, the federal treaty was a conventional solution to 
the security concerns of republics. Although the principal security threat to the American 
states was civil war, a limited threat existed also in the western borderlands from American 
Indian nations and their European allies, and from naval attacks and amphibious assaults on 
Atlantic port cities by European naval powers, as evidenced in the War of Independence and 
the War of 1812 alike. But as long as the United States was at peace with European North 
American powers, a borderlands war would likely be instigated by Americans, either through 
brash government action or freelance aggression by European American settlers.47 
Concerted international action also promised to protect and promote material interests 
by expanding white settlements in the western borderlands and by promoting Atlantic and 
global trade. The cost of war and the relative weakness of the United States meant that 
negotiation rather than armed aggression was the most realistic means to reach such goals. To 
make that possible, however, the power over foreign affairs and Indian diplomacy had to be 
transferred from the states to the national government by the process of voluntary 
circumscription of state sovereignty Vattel had identified as an intrinsic part of the federal 
treaty. In 1787, the Atlantic marketplace was structured by trading nations’ attempts to 
exclude or restrict political and economic competitors from access to their home markets and 
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colonial dependencies. These restrictions could be circumvented by trading illicitly, but 
commercial agreements were a more effective means to promote economic interests.48 
To conclude a commercial agreement a nation had to be seen as ‘treaty-worthy,’ in 
Eliga Gould’s phrase, and under the Articles of Confederation, the United States was not. In 
their extended essay ‘A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of 
Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition,’ David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosh 
argue that the Constitution of 1787 was both caused and profoundly shaped by the need for 
the United States to pass muster as a member of the European ‘civilized family of nations.’ 
‘The fundamental purpose of the Federal Constitution,’ they write, ‘was to create a nation-
state that the European powers would recognize, in the practical and legal sense, as a 
‘civilized state’ worthy of equal respect in the international community.’ Gould, too, has 
shown that independence raised the problem of exactly how the United States would take its 
place among the ‘Powers of the Earth.’49 
The ‘family of civilized nations’ consisted of countries that demonstrated their readiness 
to abide by the law of nations, a system of norms established by European diplomats and 
promulgated by European jurists to govern interactions between European nations and 
nationals. The decision by American political leaders and their constituents that the United 
States, too, would live by the law of nations, signifies that American independence was less 
the start of American exceptionalism than ‘an attempt to remake the former colonies in 
Europe’s image.’50 That decision was first pronounced with the Declaration of Independence 
                                                      
48 John E. Crowley, Privileges of Independence: Neo-Mercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 
Md., 1993) argues that American statesmen failed to appreciate that Britain maintained a difference between the 
exchange of goods, where British post-independence policy was liberal, and shipping, where it was mercantilist. 
After independence, American political leaders wished for a return to the colonial order that allowed American 
ships to carry goods within the British Empire with few restrictions. On the Atlantic commercial regime, see also 
Matson and Onuf, Union and Interest, 67-81; Onuf and Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World; Van Cleve, We 
Have Not a Government. 
49 Golove and Hulsebosch, ‘Civilized Nation,’ 935; Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth, 130.  
50 Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth, 3. On the law of nations and American political development, see also 
Onuf and Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World and Onuf and Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War. 
29 
 
and was followed by the state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation. It took the form 
of written constitutional documents in part because of the need for Americans to convey it to, 
and display it in, European courts and courts of opinion. Printed and bound in a ‘revolutionary 
portfolio,’ the documents were carried abroad by American envoys to demonstrate to the 
world that the law of nations spanned the Atlantic.51 
The Constitution continued the attempt to make the United States pass as ‘treaty-
worthy’ by rectifying the failures of the Articles of Confederation. Historians agree that the 
violations of the peace treaty of 1783 by several of the American states were ‘the most 
dramatic manifestation’ of the Union’s inability to conduct foreign affairs in accordance with 
European norms. Such diplomatic incompetence repeatedly torpedoed postwar attempts to 
realize American international aspirations, ‘as painfully witnessed by the repeated failures and 
humiliations experience by American diplomats.’ In particular, it proved impossible to make 
Britain agree to a treaty that would extricate the United States from its neo-colonial 
dependence on the former mother country to place American commerce and international 
status on par with that of European nations.52 
The management of foreign affairs was the duty of Congress also under the Articles and 
the issue facing the Constitutional convention was not so much to increase as to make the 
powers of the national government effective. Doing so involved preventing ‘illegal acts of 
hostility on the part of Americans themselves,’ most importantly acts perpetuated by the state 
governments against foreign nationals.53 Accordingly, the Constitution gave the new federal 
government a monopoly on foreign affairs and restricted the powers of the states. Congress 
was granted war-making powers and the right to regulate commerce (Art. I, sect. 8), the latter 
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of which was a new authority. A federal judiciary was created and given sole jurisdiction over 
disputes in maritime and admiralty law, where the vast majority of cases arising under the law 
of nations would originate, as well as all cases involving foreign nationals (Art. III). By 
establishing a single executive who was both commander in chief and empowered to make 
treaties (Art. II, sect. 2), the convention equipped the United States with a president that 
carried some resemblance to the British monarch. 
Progressive historians are correct to argue that the framers intended to shield the 
national government from state and popular influence over foreign affairs. Under the 
Constitution, treaties take effect on ratification by the Senate, the less popular of the 
legislative branches, and when ratified automatically become the supreme law of the land 
‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding’ (Art. 
VI), thereby overriding state sovereignty in foreign affairs. By granting the federal courts 
jurisdiction over all cases arising under international treaties the framers ensured ‘that the 
federal judiciary would be available to uphold federal authority against recalcitrant states.’ In 
a parallel move (Art I, sect. 10), the states were stripped of their foreign affairs power by 
explicit proscriptions against entering into any ‘Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation’ or making 
any ‘Agreement or Compact’ with another state or foreign nation without congressional 
consent. The states were also prohibited from regulating commerce by imposing import and 
tonnage duties and they had neither the right to make war or to maintain troops or warships in 
peacetime. The restrictions on the states from issuing paper money or impairing the obligation 
of contracts reassured foreign nations that the rights of their subjects under international 
treaties and the law of nations would henceforth be honored.54 
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The Constitution and the rulings of the federal courts went a long way to convince 
British merchants and diplomats that the United States would in future act in accordance with 
the law of nations and the law merchant. Although it would take several years before that 
conviction bore fruit, the United States signed commercial treaties with Britain in 1794 and 
with Spain in 1795. At long last, the new nation was seen as ‘treaty-worthy.’55 
In the Age of Revolutions, the law of nations governed the western borderlands only 
imperfectly. Consequently, Golove and Hulsebosch limit their analysis of ‘the international 
Constitution’ to relations between the federal union and the powers of Europe. In contrast, 
scholars like Gould and Leonard Sadosky have employed a broader concept of international 
history that incorporates borderlands relations and treats them as deeply intertwined with 
Atlantic diplomacy. The borderlands diplomatic regime recognized American Indian nations 
as sovereign actors with legitimate interests and territorial rights, on the one hand, but denied 
them the status of ‘civilized nations’ on par with European powers, on the other hand. At the 
same time American Indian strength and European American weakness meant that a 
precarious peace could only be maintained by continuous negotiation influenced as much by 
indigenous beliefs and practices as by the law of the imperial powers. When the military and 
administrative capacity of the national government grew after the adoption of the 
Constitution, the United States gradually re-shaped the legal geography by extending the law 
of nations into the borderlands. Because the European diplomatic regime recognized only 
‘civilized nations,’ the sovereign status of American Indian polities was thereby undermined. 
To native American peoples, the success of the United States in becoming the only recognized 
sovereign nation in the trans-Appalachian West ‘proved to be a profoundly disruptive event, 
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as the intrusion and growing authority of European notions of peace and treaty-worthiness 
created new hierarchies of value, new forms of dependency, and, often, new languages of 
exclusion.’ The end point of that development was the Supreme Court’s definition of 
American Indian tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations’ in its 1831 Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia ruling, which effectively ended the tradition of recognizing Native American nations 
as independent and accelerated the process of Indian removal.56 
Like Gould and Sadosky, Gregory Ablavsky insists in his analysis of the ‘Savage 
Constitution’ that American Indian relations were central to the framers. Along with Atlantic 
trade, American economic success depended on the successful development of the West. As 
Ablavsky points out, the Indians ‘possessed the most valuable commodity in early America:’ 
land. Rebelling against Britain, the American people and their leaders had banked on their 
ability to lay their hands on that commodity after independence. Visions of the future wealth 
of the region were legion long before the fertile lands of the Ohio and Mississippi River 
valleys became the home to a large population of European American settler-migrants. But 
unlocking the economic potential of the West required not only the transfer of western 
territory from the states to Congress, a process well under way by 1787, but also the creation 
of a legal framework for federal rule of the national domain.57 
That legal framework had to provide both for the management of a vast geographic 
space predestined for fundamental transformation, and for the management of two distinctive 
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population groups: the indigenous inhabitants that controlled the land and the white settlers 
that the government hoped would replace them. The Constitution gave Congress the ‘Power 
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States’ (Art. IV, sect. 3), but these rules and regulations 
were only fleshed out in the Northwest Ordinance, which to that extent forms an inseparable 
part of the Constitution in the American founding. The Constitution also extended Congress’s 
right to regulate commerce to include ‘the Indian Tribes’ (Art. I, sect. 8) and the same 
principle that made treaties with ‘civilized nations’ the supreme law of the land applied also to 
Indian treaties (Art. VI).58 
The Northwest Ordinance made possible the transformation of the territory north of the 
Ohio River from what contemporaries were apt to call a ‘wilderness’ into a space governed by 
the common law, republican principles of government, Christian morals, and patriarchal 
authority. It was a space reserved for white immigrant settlers and the Ordinance had little to 
say about American Indians other than that they should be treated with ‘good faith’ and that 
‘their lands and property’ would never be ‘taken from them without their consent.’ The 
government’s intention was to people the Northwest Territory with family groups managing 
freehold farms under the watchful eye of a male household head. Production would be partly 
for the market and settlement would be relatively dense, allowing for both local self-
government and market integration. Educated and kept in line by missionaries and 
government agents, the people of the Northwest Territory would be prevented from 
backsliding into barbarity. The ultimate aim was for white migrants to the West to reproduce 
their republican homelands in the East. 
This transposition of Atlantic republics into the continental interior required 
intervention by the national government in several steps. First to transfer land titles from 
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American Indian nations to the United States through a process of negotiation and purchase 
ratified by treaty; second to remove the American Indian inhabitants beyond a treaty line 
defining the land cleared for European American settlement; third to survey and sell this land 
to white settlers in farm-sized parcels; and fourth to create a colonial government to oversee 
the process of immigration and the gradual development of settler sovereignty that would 
eventually turn the Northwest Territory into sovereign republics that would join the American 
union as equal treaty parties.59 
Bethel Saler has shown how in contrast to the detailed form of government guiding the 
federal government’s rule over white settler colonies, it ruled Indian nations by creating a 
much less formalized ‘treaty polity,’ which regulated Indian territorial possession and rights. 
As the term suggests, the principal governing instrument in this polity was the Indian treaty. 
These documents ratified Indian land transfers to the United States and established a border 
line separating American Indians from European American settlers. Treaties also attempted to 
sever commercial and political links with Britain and Spain to replace them with ties to the 
United States. Treaties, finally, formulated the route by which the Indians would be ‘civilized’ 
and made to conform to European American norms of socio-economic organization.60 The 
long-term goal of US policy was not physical but cultural annihilation of Indian society, to 
‘civilize’ the indigenous population by imposing on them ideals of sedentary farming, private 
property rights, and patriarchy. Meanwhile, in a transitional period, the Indian nations were 
treated as ‘quasi-foreign political bodies’ over which the federal government ‘claimed a 
paternalistic colonial rule’ or ‘a guardianship until they metamorphosed from perceived 
                                                      
59 Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, 13 July 
1787, in Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution I, 168-74; Onuf, Statehood and Union; 
Saler, Settlers’ Empire, 17-26. 
60 Saler, Settlers’ Empire, 3-5, 26-29, 83-120. Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the 
American Revolution (New York, 2015), 219-351 describes this process from the American Indian side in the 
Old Southwest, William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West (New York, 2012) 
treats the Northwest Territory. 
35 
 
culturally alien and backward peoples into ‘civilized’ Americans ready for membership in the 
republic.’61 
 
V 
The International interpretation puts the spotlight on international and intra-union affairs 
where the Progressives have focused on domestic matters. But rather than making the 
Progressive perspective redundant, the International interpretation makes it possible to 
approach the old question of who should rule at home with fresh eyes. By presenting the 
Constitution as a federal treaty that left the internal arrangement of the states largely alone, 
the unionist perspective forces us to recognize that the ground rules determining who should 
rule at home were created through a much more complex process, taking place at different 
levels of government and involving multiple sources of law, than the Progressive account 
allows. And by highlighting the role of the federal government in commercial and territorial 
expansion it opens new areas that can be fruitfully analyzed as sites of struggle between social 
group over material resources. A proper understanding of the constitutional settlement of 
1787 requires us to recognize the impact of the Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance on 
the organization of the western borderlands and the impact of the Constitution on international 
relations in the Atlantic marketplace. But it also means going beyond the Constitution and 
national politics to account for change and stasis at state and local level. 
In 1787, the trans-Appalachian West made up roughly half the national domain of the 
United States. To exclude this enormous region and its population from the analysis of who 
came to rule at home is surely impossible after decades of American Indian and borderlands 
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historians have emphasized their importance to the course of American history. In fact, their 
work asks historians to recognize that what is at stake in the struggle over who should rule at 
home is not only the distribution of political authority but also the geographic boundaries of 
what the United States claimed was its ‘home.’ The fiscal, military, and administrative 
resources that the Constitution invested in the new federal government made possible the 
gradual transformation of the West into American republics. In the train of federal soldiers 
came surveyors and land agents followed by settler colonists. Between 1791 and 1810, Indian 
treaties transferred some 170,000 square miles of land—an area about three and a half times 
the size of England—to the United States, the bulk of which was passed on to white settlers. 
They filled up the land quickly. In 1790, there were 110,000 settler colonists living in what 
became the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. By the turn of the eighteenth century, that 
figure had almost tripled. An additional 50,000 settlers resided in territories that would 
become Ohio and Indiana. Of the Kentucky residents in 1800, 40,000 were slaves forcefully 
removed from the Chesapeake, thus highlighting how western expansion was also slavery’s 
expansion. This peopling of the West was made possible only by the removal of the American 
Indian proprietors of the land and the disciplining of the ethnically and culturally mixed 
borderlands population that chose to remain.62 
In the short term the Constitution’s effect on Atlantic trade was overshadowed by the 
impact of the long European and global war triggered by the French Revolution. But 
throughout the 1790s and early nineteenth century, American trade expanded dramatically 
and brought riches to Atlantic port cities at least in part thanks to the now internationally 
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recognized ‘treaty worthiness’ of the United States. This successful and prolonged immersion 
in the Atlantic marketplace ensured that the southern states would continue to be major 
exporters of agricultural staple products such as tobacco, rice, indigo, sugar, and, above all, 
cotton. Due to their mode of production, the expansion of these staples also caused the 
expansion of slavery. In 1790, close to 700,000 persons, almost one in five inhabitants, were 
enslaved in the United States. In 1861, they were four million. They too have to be part of our 
account of who came to rule at home.63 
Indian removal and decimation and slavery’s demographic and geographic expansion 
point to the need to look beyond the overt political struggles of white males when analyzing 
the distribution of power and social resources that resulted from the constitutional settlement 
of 1787. The ‘social death’ of the slave represents an extreme case of total negation of rights 
to property and person.64 But others, too, had their rights and liberty circumscribed. In fact, 
the vast majority of early American inhabitants lived under the authority of a master who 
possessed far-reaching rights to their bodies, labor, and property. So-called household 
government formed the bedrock of the American republics. Social and legal historians have 
shown how under its laws wives were subject to their husbands, children to their father, and 
servants to their master. Household government cannot be dismissed as a marginal 
phenomenon because for most people it was the only government they knew. As Carole 
Shammas has pointed out, ‘[m]ost inhabitants of early America had no direct access to the 
state; the household head mediated between his dependents, whether children, wife, servants, 
slaves, or wards, and formal government bodies.’ The question of who, in the most literal 
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sense, was to rule at home is central to any story of the American founding that aims at 
inclusiveness.65 
The Constitution is silent on the law of the household for the simple reason that it 
remained a matter of state regulation also after 1787. Rather than radical reform, the citizens 
of the newly independent American states and their elected leaders chose to perpetuate and 
accentuate a socio-legal order put in place during colonial times.66 Continuity rather than 
change characterized household government in the Age of Revolutions. Quoting Shammas 
again, ‘considering the amount of constituting writing that went on, what is most remarkable 
is the reluctance to rein in the powers of the household head.’67 This was due to neither 
oversight nor lethargy. To the contrary, a core element of republican citizenship was the 
power of the citizen over his dependents. Household government was complemented by local 
government institutions—town meetings, county courts, slave patrols—which stepped in 
when masters failed to maintain or control their household dependents and which coordinated 
and administered tasks that individual households could not undertake on their own—such as 
poor relief, road construction, and adjudication. Like the rights and duties of citizens and their 
dependents, these institutions were created and regulated by state rather than federal law. 
William Novak has shown that far from a laissez-faire society where government intervention 
in social and economic affairs was shunned, a ‘distinctive and powerful governmental 
tradition devoted in theory and practice to the vision of a well-regulated society dominated 
United States social and economic policy-making’ in the nineteenth century.68 Whereas 
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Novak tend to embrace this tradition of ‘police regulation’ as the expression of local self-
determination, Gary Gerstle and others have highlighted how the citizenry’s command over 
local governmental institutions were used for the surveillance, punishment, and reform of 
those who fell outside the control of the patriarchal household—single women, the destitute, 
non-‘whites’, vagrants, and aliens.69 
If the Constitution was a federal treaty, investigations of the struggle over who should 
rule at home, in all its complexity, need to pay attention to the federal government but also to 
look carefully at what was happening in state assemblies and town meetings. But such 
investigations cannot stop there. They have to go beyond even the politics of the street to 
investigate power structures and power struggles in the allegedly apolitical spaces of the court 
room and the workplace, the congregation, the orphanage, and the asylum, and the household 
and the family. 
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